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Executive summary 
 
The purpose of this review is to provide an overview of the published and grey literatures 
relating to the use of foresight-type approaches and techniques in policy-related work in 
international development. The review is guided by questions around who has used foresight 
approaches, the kinds of issues foresight approaches have been used to address, which 
techniques have been most commonly used, what evidence there is that the results of 
foresight initiatives have been used and/or have been useful, and the level of resources 
devoted to foresight exercises. As outlined in the introductory section, the methodology 
applied to this review included identification of grey and published literature (in English) 
through a systematic search strategy using Web of Knowledge and Google Scholar, follow-
up on articles cited, and interviews with key actors in the field. The author acknowledges 
limitations of the review exercise, and notably the gap between practice and documentation 
of practice.  
 
In general terms, foresight is about understanding the future systematically, usually 
considering a horizon of at least ten years into the future (Kuosa 2011: 9). This review 
focuses on initiatives that explicitly adopt a foresight/futures approach, applying processes, 
tools and techniques selected from the foresight toolkit. Foresight thinking and futures 
analysis can serve a variety of purposes in relation to policy and decision-making, and whilst 
there is a basic process applicable to any foresight initiative, the approach and tools must be 
tailored to the project in question. One principal distinction is made between quantitative 
studies that rely heavily on modelling methods, and qualitative approaches that provide a 
narrative description of futures issues, paths and uncertainties; in practice, these methods 
are increasingly used in combination (EEA 2011a). Another principal distinction is made 
between horizon scanning (aka environment scanning), model-based projections, and 
broader scenario-planning approaches. One aspect which has particular relevance to 
international development is the nature of stakeholder participation in the foresight process. 
 
A review of the literature indicates that foresight initiatives have been undertaken around the 
world by a wide range of international development actors including international 
intergovernmental organisations, governments in the global North, philanthropic foundations, 
as well as academia and civil society organisations (CSOs) in the North and South. 
Examples of foresight initiatives can be found at the national, regional or global level in 
sectors such as health, agriculture and food, governance, conflict and security, climate 
change and the environment, technology and innovation. However, documentation on 
foresight initiatives undertaken in least developed countries is relatively sparse. The level of 
resources invested in foresight initiatives ranges from minimal cost to US$24m spent on a 
large-scale international project such as the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in 2005. 
 
The OECD Secretariat, EU Commission, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
and UNESCO all have dedicated futures research units. United Nations (UN) agencies have 
sponsored many high-profile foresight exercises to explore concerns and problems that 
transcend national boundaries, such as the Global Environment Outlook (GEO5) and the 
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The 
UN supported an extensive online participatory policymaking foresight exercise in Latin 
America (Hilbert, Miles and Othmer 2009), and in the early 1990s UNDP provided technical 
support to 25 national studies of long-term perspectives, such as Burundi Vision 2025. The 
UK Foresight Programme has in recent years generated a significant number of evidence 
reviews on thematic areas of relevance to international development, such as food and 
farming, disasters, migration, and infectious diseases. The UK’s Foresight Horizon Scanning 
Centre has supported horizon scanning activities in a wide range of UK government 
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departments, including the Department for International Development (DFID). The 
Rockefeller Foundation has its own horizon scanning programme with partners across Asia, 
Africa and the Americas, with a view to informing philanthropic decision-making. 
 
There is evidence of scenarios being developed as part of foresight initiatives by 
international development actors. Scenarios are used in a number of ways – to stimulate the 
development of new policies, as the basis for a strategic vision, or to review or test a range 
of plans and policy options. Gordon (2011) classifies scenarios in two ways: those that are 
developed by organisations and institutions in order to ensure the organisations are fit for 
purpose (adaptive), and scenarios that serve to influence and shape the future (normative). 
Section 4 provides examples of ways in which narrative scenarios, both adaptive and 
normative, have been developed and applied by various development actors on a more 
modest scale than the large foresight studies associated with intergovernmental 
organisations. They include examples of DFID’s application of scenarios in strategic 
planning, and broader national scenario processes facilitated by the Society for International 
Development in East Africa. 
 
Whilst the foresight literature provides plenty of examples of the challenges of embedding 
foresight studies in policy decision-making, few attempts at external evaluation of futures 
and foresight work have been identified worldwide, and there is scant literature on evaluation 
frameworks for foresight initiatives. Different approaches to evaluation include the 
development of typologies of policy impact (Johnston 2010), and the evaluation of intangible 
as well as tangible outcomes (Kuosa 2011), including changes in networking and information 
flows. The literature on the impact of scenarios is interesting in that it tends to focus on 
transformational processes and changes to individuals’ mental models. Evidence of impact 
is compelling but largely anecdotal. The author of this review suggests in Section 5 that 
given the complexity of the policy environment and the non-linearity of policymaking 
processes, it makes sense to focus on assessing the extent to which the level of futures 
literacy has changed among key stakeholders and decision-makers as a result of the 
foresight process, by considering indicators at individual, organisational/institutional levels.  
 
The author concludes in Section 6 that the body of evidence on foresight initiatives in 
international development is highly fragmented. This paper represents the first attempt to 
review the evidence of the application of foresight approaches and techniques to policy-
related work in international development. Futures thinking has not entered mainstream 
discourse or practice in international development, and literature on foresight in the 
international humanitarian field is scant. Nevertheless, foresight has an important role to play 
in international development. Futures thinking could be more effectively integrated into 
strategy planning cycles of international development institutions across the board; this 
would require greater futures literacy among international development actors. National-level 
policy thinktanks in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world have a particular role to 
play in supporting foresight studies, and promoting methodological adaptation and 
innovation in their various contexts. There is also a great opportunity to harness rapid 
advancements in the field of information and communication technology (ICT) for crowd-
sourcing and collective intelligence as part of foresight exercises, countering the more 
traditional top-down, expert-led approaches.  
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1 Introduction  
 
The purpose of this review is to provide an overview of the published and grey literatures 
relating to the use of foresight-type approaches and techniques in policy-related work in 
international development. The review is guided by questions around who has used foresight 
approaches, the kinds of issues foresight approaches have been used to address, which 
techniques have been most commonly used, what evidence there is that the results of 
foresight initiatives have been used and/or have been useful, and the level of resources 
devoted to foresight exercises. 
 
Foresight is evolving as an independent discipline (Kuosa 2011: 3). In general terms, 
foresight is about understanding the future systematically, usually considering a horizon of at 
least ten years into the future (ibid.: 9). Whilst there are multiple and contested definitions of 
foresight, it is the definition provided by Slaughter (1995: 48, in Kuosa 2011) that is adopted 
for the purposes of this review. Slaughter defines foresight as a process that attempts to 
broaden the boundaries of perception in four ways: by assessing the implications of present 
actions and decisions; by detecting and avoiding problems before they occur; by considering 
the present implications of possible future events; and by envisioning aspects of desired 
futures. 
 
Loveridge, Keenan and Saritas (2010: 151) describe foresight processes as being method-
bound. There is a plethora of tools and techniques, and these are applied, singly or in 
combination, by foresight practitioners working in different domains. In reality, broader 
research studies may be future-oriented, but they do not necessarily apply methods 
associated with the field of foresight (Nisbett, interview 7 May 2014). This paper focuses on 
initiatives that explicitly adopt a foresight/futures approach, with processes, tools and 
techniques selected from the foresight toolkit. 
 
For the purposes of this review, international development initiatives are characterised by a 
common objective, that of reduction of poverty and/or inequality in low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs); whilst governments and citizens of the LMICs play a critical role in this 
development, ‘international’ development in this context signifies the involvement of one or 
more actors or institutions with a regional or global remit beyond any one LMIC, such as a 
government agency, intergovernmental organisation, non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
or philanthropic foundation. Policy-related work is interpreted as relating broadly to decision-
making processes in respect of organisational and institutional policies, strategies and 
funding priorities. 
 
The methodology applied to this review included identification of grey and published 
literature (in English) through a systematic search strategy using Web of Knowledge and 
Google Scholar, follow-up on articles cited, and interviews with key actors in the field. The 
author acknowledges various limitations of the review exercise, namely that whilst the 
literature offers a window on to actual practice in terms of application of foresight techniques 
within international development, it is not comprehensive for a number of reasons: there is 
likely to be much more in the way of organisational (grey) literature which is not publicly 
available; the original scoping paper for a given initiative is rarely accessible, and peer-
reviewed journal articles may only present a particular aspect of a foresight initiative rather 
than a holistic and detailed overview; and finally, practitioners who specialise in foresight 
may not necessarily be resourced or incentivised to write about their work.  
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In this review, Section 2 provides an overview of the foresight toolkit, the tools, techniques 
and approaches most commonly associated with foresight. Section 3 presents a broad 
mapping of the foresight landscape, as relevant to international development. In Section 4, 
the author shares examples of scenario processes used in a variety of international 
development contexts. The author then reflects on the evidence of use and impact of 
foresight initiatives in Section 5, before concluding and suggesting future directions for 
foresight in international development in Section 6. 
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2 The Foresight toolkit 
 
Foresight thinking and futures analysis can serve a variety of purposes in relation to policy 
and decision-making, including the exploratory identification of long-term issues; setting 
agendas for research, action or investment; building visions and mobilising key actors. 
Kuosa (2011: 22) outlines the basic process that is broadly applicable to any foresight 
initiative, from research-type inputs through stages of analysis, interpretation and 
prospection to production of outputs; though as emphasised by Rhydderch (2013), the 
selection of approach and tools must be tailored to the project in question. Numerous 
foresight techniques are available for very different, specific purposes (EEA 2011b: 16). One 
principal distinction is made between quantitative studies, that rely heavily on modelling 
methods, and are commonly used in fields of study such as macroeconomics, energy and 
climate change; and qualitative approaches, that provide a narrative description of futures 
issues, paths and uncertainties, and that have been applied in many sectors ranging from 
technology foresight to environment and politics (EEA 2011a: 9). Each approach has its 
advantages and limitations, and in practice, quantitative modelling and qualitative methods 
are increasingly used in combination.  
 
Another principal distinction is made between horizon scanning (or environment scanning) 
approaches, which may involve scanning various sources (including non-traditional literature 
such as newspapers and blogs) for information on emerging trends; model-based 
projections that can provide an understanding of causal relationships; and broader scenario-
planning approaches.1 In their course on foresight, Loveridge et al. (2010) foreground 
methods such as Delphi (a large-scale survey tool) and technology road-mapping, in 
addition to scenarios and horizon-scanning approaches. The international development 
sector is multi-sectoral, and foresight tools and techniques such as those listed are selected 
and applied from the general field of foresight. Typically, certain disciplines favour particular 
approaches according to their epistemological biases.  
 
Valuable sources of information on specific foresight techniques and tools include UK 
Horizon Scanning Programme Team’s Futures Toolkit (Cabinet Office and Government 
Office for Science 2014), and the Futures Research Methodology compendium produced by 
the Millennium Project,2 the latest edition comprising 39 chapters with detailed information on 
a wide range of foresight methods (Glenn and Gordon n.d.). Both sources detail techniques 
and tools most commonly associated with the general field of foresight. Loveridge and Cox 
(2013), of the Manchester Institute of Innovation Research (MIoIR), have produced a guide 
entitled Innovation for Development: Knowledge and Research Application to Address 
International Development Goals – A Toolkit. Published by UNESCO, it is intended for use 
by planners, policymakers, decision-makers and other relevant bodies in government, NGOs 
and the private sector. The notion of ‘toolkit’ is slightly misleading, as the publication does 
not focus on methods or tools; however, it recognises technology and innovation as a major 
force on human development and vice versa, and does provide readers with a good 
introduction to technology foresight more broadly. 
 
Foresight methods are evolving, and being adapted to different contexts. The Millennium 
Project has developed various tools, including the Real-Time Delphi (an adaptation of the 
                                               
1 The authors note that technical models used to predict the future are increasingly viewed with scepticism, because of the data 
and assumptions employed and the opacity of the calculations undertaken (EEA 2011a: 7). Whilst forecasting is still an 
important element of foresight, its limitations are recognised in relation to complex social and human issues, and the high levels 
of uncertainty associated with long-term futures.   
2 The Millennium Project, funded by the UN University, UNDP, UNESCO and the US Environment Protection Agency (EPA), 
describes itself as an independent, non-profit, global participatory futures research thinktank that connects futurists, scholars, 
business planners and policymakers around the world to explore prospects for humanity as a whole. 
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Delphi which originated in Japan), and the State of the Future Index (SOFI). The SOFI is a 
quantitative time series that indicates the changing state of the future and shows whether 
conditions promise to get better or worse. The Millennium Project regularly publishes global 
and regional studies such as the 2013–14 State of the Future, a global report based on the 
SOFI, a Real-Time Delphi to collect expert judgements, and a trend impact analysis (Glenn, 
Gordon and Florescu 2014). National-level State of the Future reports have also been 
produced, but the SOFI is currently only applied in a selection of developed countries. Martin 
(2011: 1), in his case study on Australian overseas development programming in Timor-
Leste, argues for the applicability of utilising the SOFI to forecast the future of small 
developing nations across a range of areas ‘that are considered important determinants of 
the type of future a developing country is likely to experience’. In a collaboration initiated by 
a member of the Central European Node of the Millennium Project, Nováček et al. (2007) 
propose a new tool, the Quality of Life and Sustainability Index, for use by government 
agencies and development NGOs to support the formulation of future-oriented development 
in Haiti, the poorest country in the Western hemisphere. 
 
In terms of overall approach, one aspect of foresight initiatives which has particular 
relevance to international development is the nature of stakeholder participation in the 
process. In their catalogue of environmental scenarios, the European Environment Agency 
(EEA 2011a) makes a useful distinction between initiatives that are analytic (defined as 
desk-based research and analysis by an individual or a group) and those that are 
participative. In the broader literature, the rationale for participatory processes varies widely, 
and is often implicit rather than explicit. Many government foresight units recognise the 
importance of involving key policy stakeholders in the foresight initiative from the start, in 
order to inform the process and findings, and to secure buy-in and enhance the likelihood of 
the findings ultimately informing decision-making; this mirrors practice in research uptake 
more broadly. Havas, Schartinger and Weber (2010) describe some of the process benefits 
associated with developing context-specific scenarios. However, in describing processes as 
‘participative’, documentation of foresight initiatives often fails to distinguish between expert 
participation and ordinary citizen participation; this likely reflects implicit assumptions 
regarding how policy change is achieved,3 and also regarding whose voices count in the 
policymaking process. A separate strand of the foresight literature does, however, focus on 
the opportunities for anticipatory democracy (see, for example, Bezold 2010), and ways in 
which network-based, participatory foresight efforts, enabled by innovations in information 
and communication technology (ICT), can and should be harnessed to make futures thinking 
a popular process, and to allow futures thinking ‘to reflect the needs of the vast majority of 
people, rather than the interests of the few’ (Ramos, Mansfield and Priday 2012: 86). 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3 See Stachowiak (2007) on the theories around policy change, notably power elites theory versus community organising 
theory. 
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3 Mapping the Foresight landscape 
3.1  A global overview 
A review of the literature indicates that foresight initiatives have been undertaken around the 
world by a wide range of international development actors including international 
intergovernmental organisations (multilateral agencies), governments in the global North (or 
bilateral agencies), philanthropic foundations, as well as academia (universities, research 
institutes, policy thinktanks) and NGOs/CSOs in the North and South. Examples of foresight 
initiatives can be found at the national, regional or global level in sectors such as health, 
agriculture and food, governance, conflict and security, climate change and the environment, 
technology and innovation. However, documentation on foresight initiatives undertaken in 
least developed countries is relatively sparse. The level of resources invested in foresight 
initiatives varies enormously, from a modest local exercise conducted involving a few staff 
members at minimal cost, to a large-scale international project costing US$24 million (the 
total cost of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in 2005) at the upper end of the scale.4 
 
There are varying degrees of foresight activity in different regions. In Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) has played a 
pivotal role in the development of a foresight culture (Popper and Medina 2008: 259). 
UNIDO’s Technology Foresight Programme for Latin America and the Caribbean (TFLAC) 
was launched in 1999; this led Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela 
to initiate preparatory activities for setting up national programmes, but only some of these 
countries managed to institutionalise a technology foresight programme (ibid.). According to 
the most recent mapping exercise undertaken by the European Foresight Monitoring 
Network (EFMN), foresight initiatives in Latin America tend to be national in scope and feed 
into national policymaking processes, but they are more often sponsored by non-state actors 
such as international organisations or NGOs than by their own government (EFMN 2009: 
36).  
 
The main focus of the EFMN mapping exercise is on technology foresight, as reflected by 
the choice of research categories. No information is presented around the cost of the 
initiatives mapped by the EFMN, but it is assumed that in general they represent the larger-
scale foresight activities. Africa is excluded from the data altogether; the authors 
acknowledge that Africa remains underrepresented in the report, and attribute this in part to 
the fact that foresight is commonly understood as technology foresight, and ‘Africa’s roles in 
technological innovation remain rather limited (and perhaps in some respects invisible)’, and 
that work undertaken by forecasters, modellers or scenario-builders in other topics unrelated 
to technology are not properly represented (EFMN 2009: Foreword). In the same vein, the 
Global Foresight Outlook 2007 data indicates that only 11 of 846 initiatives mapped globally 
are African; in comparing foresight ‘style’ in six world regions, Keenan and Popper (2008: 
34) note that ‘the data for Oceania and Africa have been deemed inadequate for inclusion in 
our analysis’. It is clear then that African foresight initiatives are largely excluded from these 
global mapping exercises.  
 
Under the umbrella of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), a Center for Technology 
Foresight was established under the aegis of the Thai National Science and Technology 
Development Agency (NSTDA). This Center has conducted a number of multi-economy 
                                               
4 Loveridge et al. (2010: 150) comment on a ‘growing number of foresight exercises being carried out around the world’. They 
note, however, that much of the more recent growth in foresight activity is outside the traditional large-scale programmes, and 
observe a growing interest in organisational, sectoral and regional foresight, much of which is more modest in scope and scale.  
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foresight projects, including on mega-cities, water supply and management, smart transport, 
education and nanotechnology, and is developing networks across the highly disparate 
APEC countries (Johnston 2002). 
3.2  International institutional programmes 
The OECD Secretariat and the EU Commission created dedicated futures research units in 
the late 1980s, and UNDP and UNESCO followed suit in the early 1990s (Sagasti 2004). 
The OECD’s International Futures Programme promotes forums, projects and networks. A 
cursory analysis of OECD’s recent foresight studies indicates that their primary policy focus 
is on OECD member countries, although one recent foresight study of the ‘bioeconomy to 
2030’ explicitly states the relevance of its findings to developing countries (OECD 2009). The 
Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC), a member of the OECD Development Cluster, is a 
group of West African regional organisations, countries and international organisations that 
exchange experiences and perspectives to help build more effective regional policies. The 
SWAC Secretariat plays a role in foresight, by providing independent and forward-looking 
analysis which aims to enrich the debate and better inform decision-makers about future 
challenges.  
 
In 1992, UNDP set up the African Futures project to support African countries to undertake 
forward-looking studies and develop a long-term vision of their development. Between 1992 
and 1995, the African Futures project provided technical support to the planning and 
implementation of 25 national studies of long-term perspectives, processes which mobilised 
development actors in Africa and led them to reflect on visions and alternative strategies for 
the future; one example of such a process is Burundi Vision 2025. Publications of the African 
Futures project include a set of four scenarios for Africa in the year 2025 (Sall and Mbeki 
2003). In early 2004, UNDP established the African Futures Institute (AFI) in order to 
harness the gains made under the African Futures project, and to sustain futures analysis in 
the region. Registered in South Africa, the AFI positions itself as a pan-African organisation, 
with a vision to facilitate Africa’s formulation of its own path to development, developing its 
own methods and approaches.  
 
UNESCO’s Foresight Programme is located in its Bureau of Strategic Planning, and it 
convenes a futures forum, as well as organising lectures and seminars. The stated purpose 
of the programme is to sensitise members of the global UNESCO Secretariat as well as 
member states to future trends in education, the natural sciences, the social and human 
sciences, culture and information and communication, and to support member states in 
developing their own capacities and approaches in the field of foresight. In May 2014, a 
three-day forum was organised by UNESCO’s Imagining Africa’s Futures project, in 
collaboration with the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, and the Southern 
African Node of the Millennium Project. This symposium, ‘All Africa Futures Forum: 
Transforming Africa’s Future’, brought together African futures thinkers and practitioners with 
the aim of exploring ‘how the “discipline of anticipation” has been shaped and applied in 
Africa and how it can be deliberately leveraged towards transforming Africa’s future onto 
more positive trajectories.’5 One of the stated objectives was to enable the establishment of 
an African Network of Foresight Practitioners. 
 
Hilbert et al. (2009) describe an initiative supported by the UN that they believe to be the 
‘most extensive online participatory policy-making foresight exercise in the history of 
intergovernmental processes in the developing world to date’. The process comprised a five-
round Delphi exercise, and secured 1,454 contributions, which were then fed into 
intergovernmental decision-making as part of the Regional Action Plan for the Information 
Society in Latin America and the Caribbean (eLAC2010). The authors highlight the 
                                               
5 http://en.unesco.org/events/all-africa-futures-forum-transforming-africa%E2%80%99s-future (accessed 1 August 2014). 
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governments’ acknowledgement of the value of collective intelligence from civil society, 
academic and private sector participants of the Delphi and the ensuing appreciation of 
participative policymaking; they also propose that the process demonstrates the role that can 
be played by the UN (and other intergovernmental agencies) in international participatory 
policymaking in the digital age, especially if they modernise the way they assist member 
countries in developing public policy agendas. On the basis of the eLAC experience, Hilbert 
et al. (ibid.) advocate the potential of online foresight tools to facilitate participation in 
resource-scarce developing countries.  
 
UN agencies have sponsored many high-profile foresight exercises to explore concerns and 
problems that transcend national boundaries, and thus are relevant to international 
development. Examples of international assessments are shown in Table 3.1.   
Table 3.1   Examples of international assessments outlining scenarios for 
the future 
International 
assessment 
Year report 
published 
Qualitative/quantitative scenarios Policy focus 
Global 
Environment 
Outlook GEO4 
2012 The qualitative narratives are 
central, whilst the nine quantitative 
analytical tools play a supporting 
role 
Broad policy goals 
include alleviating 
poverty 
Millennium 
Ecosystem 
Assessment 
2005 Qualitative (narratives produced by 
expert judgements) and quantitative 
(using computer modelling to 
produce quantitative indicators) 
Broad policy goals 
include protection of 
human wellbeing 
Source: EEA (2011a) and Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005). 
 
The latest Global Environment Outlook, GEO-5 (UNEP 2012: 489), builds on previous GEO 
reports and continues to provide an analysis of the state, trends and outlook of the global 
environment. It differs from previous GEO reports in its emphasis on internationally agreed 
goals (such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and those of various multilateral 
environmental agreements) and in providing possible means of accelerating achievement of 
those goals. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment presents a range of mixed method 
scenarios for how the quantity and quality of ecosystem goods and services may change in 
coming decades.  
 
UN agencies are also among the sponsors of the Global Energy Assessment 2012, which 
adopts futures horizons of 2020, 2050 and 2100 (GEA 2012). The final report includes a 
chapter dedicated to consideration of energy in relation to poverty and development. Central 
to the integrated analysis of the energy system is a scenario exercise exploring some 40 
pathways that satisfy simultaneously the aspirational social and environmental goals 
articulated by the GEA (ibid.: Preface); one of the four stated goals is that of universal 
access to modern energy services by 2030. 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established to address global 
warming; the assessment comprises construction of a range of scenarios of the effects of 
various factors related to global warming and their consequences. In 2013 and 2014, the 
IPCC released three components of its Fifth Assessment Report; full reports are due to be 
released by October 2014.  
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3.3  The UK Foresight programme 
The UK Foresight programme was established in 1994 to embed a futures approach in 
strategic policymaking in government. It is considered a relatively mature programme in the 
European context, together with Sweden and the Netherlands (EEA 2011b). With a budget 
of £2 million per year (Parke, interview 7 November 2013),  the UK Foresight programme 
conducts major two-year studies, with the primary purpose of informing UK policy, although 
increasingly the studies are global in nature. The major UK foresight studies follow a 
standard process, selecting foresight techniques from a basic menu, to generate a body of 
evidence on the topic in question (through the commissioning of evidence papers); a final 
synthesis is also produced with key messages but no recommendations. These studies are 
essentially expert-led, reflecting the ‘less egalitarian/participative tradition to policy making’ 
observed in the institutional arrangements of the UK (EEA 2011b: 49).6 There is, however, 
broader engagement with stakeholders, and especially decision-makers, from an early stage 
in the process in order to secure their buy-in and to facilitate effective uptake of the findings. 
Table 3.2 outlines the main projects of the UK Foresight programme that intersect with 
international development.7  
Table 3.2  Projects of the UK Foresight programme with relevance to 
international development 
Project Collaboration Papers 
commissioned 
Reducing Risks of 
Future Disasters 
(2010–12) 
Expert group involved representatives from NGOs, 
academia and the private sector 
14 papers 
Global Food and 
Farming Futures8  
(2009–11) 
Politically co-sponsored by DFID and DEFRA.  
 
Follow-up actions9 identified for UN, OECD, 
Oxfam, Gates Foundation and World Economic 
Forum 
>100 evidence 
papers 
Migration and Global 
Environmental Change 
(2009–11) 
Partners included UNHCR, UNICEF and DFID  
 
Involved 350 experts and stakeholders, across 30 
countries. Workshops in Ghana and India 
70 papers and 
other reviews 
Detection and 
Identification of 
Infectious Diseases in 
UK and Africa  
(2004–6) 
 
Collaboration with African Union 
 
Process involved >300 leading experts and 
stakeholders from nearly 30 countries (including 
20 African countries), as well as many international 
organisations 
>60 science 
reviews, papers 
and case 
studies 
 
Against the backdrop of these large-scale studies, the UK’s Foresight Horizon Scanning 
Centre (HSC) was created in 2005 to tackle narrow policy questions often at the request of a 
particular department. Horizon scanning occurs in a wide range of UK government 
departments, including DFID, even if it does not feature among those listed in the review of 
                                               
6 This contrasts with Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands, where political tradition is more participatory (EEA 2011b: 53). 
7 In addition to the studies outlined in Table 3.2, two seminal studies were conducted on food and coastal defence, and obesity, 
but these were not undertaken with international development goals in mind, and whilst they may have had global resonance, 
no evidence regarding their impact on developing countries was available to the author. 
8 This project cost £2 million, exclusive of a team of four or five full-time staff (Nisbett, interview 7 May 2014). Other significant 
futures studies on food and agriculture include IAASTD (2009), which was launched as an intergovernmental process under the 
co-sponsorship of the FAO, GEF, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, the World Bank and WHO; and the Agrimonde project (CIRAD and 
INRA 2009) which explores possible futures of the world’s agricultural and food systems up to 2050, and seeks to identify the 
fundamental challenges that agricultural research will have to face. De Haen and Réquillart (2014) outline suggestions for 
foresight work in the area of sustainable production and consumption. 
9 Source: Foresight (2011). 
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cross-government horizon scanning led by Jon Day (Cabinet Office 2013: Annex E); the 
paper argues that ‘Horizon scanning needs to be embedded into the Civil Service mindset as 
a useful tool in decision-making. […] Horizon scanning should be seen as complementary to 
current analysis and policy thinking, not as an isolated discipline.’ Horizon scanning, deemed 
‘the foundation of foresight’ by Loveridge et al. (2010), has a distinctive role to play in the 
realm of international development, notably to support identification of key issues and 
challenges of the future, as in the case of a scanning exercise commissioned by UK 
Collaborative on Development Sciences (UKCDS) on behalf of DFID in 2010, based on 
interviews with leading international development thinkers (see Rhydderch 2010). 
3.4  The Rockefeller Foundation 
The Rockefeller Foundation has established the Searchlight function, a programme of 
horizon scanning with a view to informing philanthropic decision-making. The Rockefeller 
Foundation works with 12 partners which conduct regular regionally-focused scans across 
Asia, Africa and the Americas; partners include a range of research institutes, policy 
thinktanks, and market research companies, which are involved in data collection, analysis 
and dissemination. According to Juech and Michelsen (2012), the development and 
philanthropic sectors have generally been slow to adopt foresight practices, lagging behind 
businesses and government, and the Searchlight function represents the first systematic 
trend monitoring effort in the philanthropic and broader social sector. The Searchlight 
function ‘demonstrates how the practice of anticipating and tracking trends and envisioning 
different alternatives for how global issues might evolve can be harnessed to shape the 
future of human development and to improve the lives of poor and vulnerable populations’ 
(ibid.: 439). One of the organisations collaborating with the Rockefeller Foundation is the 
Institute for Alternative Futures (IAF), a US-based consultancy. In 2009, the IAF convened a 
workshop of leading foresight experts in Bellagio. The workshop report (Bezold et al. 2009) 
highlights the rationale and practice of pro-poor foresight – a term coined to mean foresight 
as applied for the purposes of human development – in accelerating and enhancing ‘smart 
globalisation’ and in gaining a better understanding of foresight in relation to a set of key 
issues that are relevant to the global South.  
 
The Institute for the Future (IFTF) also played a major role in Rockefeller’s Catalysts for 
Change, a project based on the premise that collaboration on a global scale can yield unique 
insights into ways to create a more prosperous, equitable future. The project sought to 
augment the diverse scans of the horizon of poverty and social change by professional 
foresight experts by integrating bottom-up crowd-sourced ideas for innovation, using a 
proper visualisation tool as a common language and framework (Vian et al. 2012: 451). To 
this end, they convened a three-day global collaborative foresight game which engaged with 
1,600-plus people in more than 79 countries. As Vian et al. (ibid: 466) observe, ‘Foresight 
and forecasting practices have their modern roots in elite institutions that often look at the 
future “from the outside in”. But in a world of high connectivity and increasing transparency 
of information, the capacity for participatory foresight practices “from within” has already 
changed the landscape of analysis and guidance of our complex global systems. The 
Catalysts for Change project joins the growing number of efforts to build a much broader 
base of foresight literacy as a core competency for our global society’. This example points 
to the potential for online tools to reach large numbers of people at global and local levels as 
part of crowd-sourcing or collective intelligence efforts in foresight processes. 
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4 Scenarios  
 
Wright, Cairns and Bradfield (2013: 561), in a journal issue which provides insights into the 
state-of-the-art in scenario methodology, define scenario techniques and methods as 
ranging from quantitative modelling approaches to qualitative narrative methods, and mixed 
methods that encapsulate both. For example, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), a 
thinktank in South Africa, uses the International Futures (IFs) forecasting system to generate 
quantitative scenarios such as those presented in African Futures 2050 (Cilliers, Hughes and 
Moyer 2011).10 A range of quantitative and qualitative and mixed method scenarios can be 
found in those generated as part of large foresight exercises such as the international 
assessments sponsored by intergovernmental organisations, and those documented in the 
EEA’s catalogue of scenarios in the environmental field (EEA 2011a). The Foresight HSC 
(2009) states that scenario planning is for medium- to long-term strategic analysis and 
planning; it describes scenarios as narratives set in the future. Scenarios offer examples of 
possible futures, which are then used to explore how the world would change if certain 
trends were to strengthen or diminish, or various events were to occur. These scenarios can 
be used to review or test a range of plans and policy options; to stimulate the development 
of new policies, or as the basis for a strategic vision; and as a means of identifying ‘early 
warning’ indicators that signal a shift towards a certain kind of future.  
 
There are a significant number of scenario sets in the public domain that relate to policy 
questions relevant to international development;11 however, they are not always 
accompanied by background information on the scoping of the exercise. Gordon (2011) 
classifies scenarios as either adaptive or normative. Adaptive (or future-aligning) scenarios 
are developed by organisations and institutions in order to ensure they are fit for purpose; 
this includes the use of scenarios as part of organisational strategic planning exercises, as 
well as country or regional-level long-term development planning and visioning. By contrast, 
normative (future-influencing) scenarios, also known as visionary scenarios, make an 
intervention in order to change the course of events acting on it, that is, to influence and 
shape the future.  The examples that follow in this section tend to make use of narratives, 
developed as part of foresight initiatives conducted on a more modest scale as compared to 
the large foresight studies associated with intergovernmental organisations.  
4.1  Adaptive scenarios 
4.1.1  DFID 
There are examples of adaptive scenario use in bilateral agencies such as DFID as well as 
INGOs. According to Foresight HSC’s Scenario Planning Guidance Note (2009: 5), ‘DFID, 
the FCO [Foreign & Commonwealth Office] and the cross-departmental Stabilisation Unit 
have undertaken country and region-focused scenario planning to inform strategy and 
programmes, and to improve coordination.’ MacDonald facilitated scenario processes for 
DFID in Sudan, Iraq and Kosovo between 2002 and 2007 (interview, 7 April 2014). The 
Sudan scenario-building exercise was a collaboration between DFID, the FCO and the 
Ministry of Defence (MoD); it was well resourced, and it comprised a research phase, 
involving three or four researchers, as well as three days in Khartoum. The Iraq scenarios of 
2007 were ‘more typical’ in resourcing terms; there was a research phase, and a workshop 
                                               
10 This report is a comprehensive look at expectations for human development, economic growth, and sociopolitical change in 
Africa over the next four decades. The ISS positions itself as a thinktank that produces policy-relevant research, and 
acknowledges funds from various bilateral governments, including Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden and Switzerland. 
11 As just one example, the South African government regularly produce scenarios (MacDonald, interview 7 April 2014). 
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convened with UK government/DFID staff based in London. The Kosovo scenarios were 
done hurriedly and on a much smaller scale, with very little research input (ibid.). Scenarios 
have also been used by DFID Yemen and DFID Nepal to develop contingency plans 
(Foresight HSC 2009: 14–18). 
 
DFID’s 2008 draft guidance on country and regional planning states that scenario planning 
should be included as part of the Country Assistance Planning (CAP) process, and that a 
brief explanation be included of how the different scenarios have informed the programming 
choices proposed. There is no evidence available on the extent to which these guidelines 
have been followed in practice. However, Foresight HSC (2009) provides two case study 
examples demonstrating ways in which scenario planning has been incorporated by DFID 
into planning exercises. The first example is DFID Bangladesh, which developed scenarios 
to 2020 to inform their new CAP. The two-month process was facilitated by external 
consultants; data were collected and analysed from internal and external sources, interviews 
were conducted with external experts on Bangladesh, and a two-day workshop was held. 
The exercise cost £75,000 and was considered expensive because they didn’t source 
expertise from within Bangladesh. The final report was made public. The second example is 
DFID Nicaragua, which led a scenario planning exercise as part of their exit strategy, as a 
way to help the wider international donor community examine their policy engagement in the 
country. The three-month exercise involved international donors, representatives of NGOs 
and civil society, the private sector and academia; Nicaraguan experts were involved in the 
analysis. Follow-up to the exercise was anticipated, with the USA and Denmark likely to lead 
in taking the outputs of the exercise into donor policy planning. 
 
There are other examples of scenario sets that have been commissioned by DFID, 
presumably to inform thematic priority-setting, such as Ballantyne, Curry and Sumner 
(2011)12 on the impacts of the financial crisis, and Pickens, Porteous and Rotman (2009) on 
scenarios for branchless banking; limited information is available on the process for these 
studies, and as such it is assumed that they were conducted as academic, desk-based 
studies. The Outsights (2004) project presents scenarios for the very poorest from 2030, 
based on the assumption that growth and development towards the 2015 MDGs will exclude 
the poorest; Outsights commissioned research papers, conducted 30 interviews with 
stakeholders from government, multilateral agencies, business, NGOs, the media, 
academia, and included 40 participants (from ten countries) in workshops. 
4.1.2  INGOs 
MacDonald (2004) outlines his approach to using scenarios with CARE International UK and 
CARE in the Sudan to clarify their role and objectives, as part of organisational strategic 
planning and reorientation. With CARE International UK, he facilitated a three-day workshop, 
which included people from other NGOs, government, and the media; journalists were 
included for their ‘ability to grasp the bigger picture’. Scenarios were developed to 2023, 
against which they then assessed their strategic options. MacDonald notes also that 
planning has to shift from linear thinking to a creative and flexible response that is able to 
anticipate change early and respond. MacDonald concludes that whereas scenario analysis 
has been widely used by the private sector since the 1970s, the ‘use of scenarios in 
development NGOs is still in its infancy and there is much still to learn’ (2004: 119). 
Ramalingham (2012) argues that development and humanitarian agencies need to be agile 
in their response, and that this fits closely with the resilience13 agenda. Scenarios, as a tool 
in the strategic planning toolkit, should therefore become a core part of business as usual. 
 
                                               
12 The authors’ methodological note indicates their use of field anomaly relaxation (FAR), a version of the morphological 
scenarios approach. 
13 DFID’s working definition of ‘resilience’ is: ‘Resilience is the ability of countries, communities and households to manage 
change, by maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses, while continuing to develop and 
without compromising their long-term prospects.’ 
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Literature on the application of foresight in the humanitarian sector is surprisingly scarce. 
Humanitarian Horizons: A Practitioners’ Guide to the Future (Humanitarian Futures 
Programme 2009), a project undertaken jointly by the Feinstein International Center of Tufts 
University and the Humanitarian Futures Programme of King’s College, London, is targeted 
at humanitarian agencies; the publication presents trends and projections based on reports 
by leading thinkers in the areas of climate change, globalisation, demographics and changes 
in the humanitarian system. The authors advocate the need for humanitarian agencies to be 
forward-thinking and to manage risk more proactively, rather than being risk averse.  
4.1.3  National planning exercises  
Many African countries have national planning commissions, and have used scenario 
building as part of processes to develop long-term strategies; examples include South 
Africa’s Vision 2025, Kenya Vision 2030, and Namibia’s Vision 2030.14 These initiatives 
reflect the broad consensus in Africa in the early 1990s that African nations needed to set 
their own agendas and anchor them in long-term visions driven by African interests and 
demands, not the outside interests that had long controlled the flow of overseas 
development assistance (Martin-Breen 2014). According to Professor Alioune Sall, Director 
of the African Futures Institute, they have been keen to ensure that foresight exercises are 
conducted as much as possible in a participatory manner, in order to facilitate citizen 
participation in reflecting on and answering core questions such as: ‘Where do we want to 
get to as nations?’ (Ibrahim 2013). He goes on to say that ‘Where our calls [for support] have 
been heeded, countries have been able to avoid the pitfalls of foresight exercises turning out 
to be another closed exercise led by technocrats talking to other technocrats; they have 
seized these as an opportunity to open and sustain a conversation on the past, the present 
and the future of the nation.’ Arguably, this kind of scenario exercise starts to converge with 
the normative or visionary type described below. 
4.2  Normative scenarios 
Andreescu et al. (2013) suggest that normative foresight exercises result in scenario 
development in which there is a greater concern with the basic values and procedural 
arrangements governing the future world depicted in the scenario, and thus construction of 
normative narratives in a participative approach predictably results in deliberations around 
democracy. This is highly relevant in the example of scenario processes in East Africa 
facilitated by the Society for International Development (SID), an international non-
governmental network of individual and institutional members across 125 countries. SID was 
instrumental in initiating processes for the development of national scenarios in Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda, and also at the regional level, with facilitation support from scenario 
expert Barbara Heinzen, but the processes were designed to maximise ownership at local 
and national level. Heinzen (2004) labels these scenarios as public interest scenarios, 
concerned with developing skills and opportunities for public dialogue, facing uncertainty 
through collaborative learning processes, and developing capacity for political agreement.  
 
According to Harcourt and Muliro (2004: 2), ‘SID’s own interest in exploring scenario 
exercises in Eastern Africa in the mid-1990s was driven largely by the fact that far-reaching 
structural adjustments were being undertaken in various countries with seemingly scant 
concern for long-term impacts and the choices that some of these adjustments would 
inevitably foster. The absence of broad-based dialogue on these key issues was one 
indicator (…)’. The South African scenarios (such as the renowned Mont Fleur scenarios)15 
also provided inspiration (Muliro, interview 7 April 2014). Whilst the special issue of the 
Development journal (Harcourt, Heinzen and Muliro 2004) does not provide a detailed 
                                               
14 As mentioned in Section 3, some of these planning and visioning exercises have been developed with support from UNDP 
and more recently the Institute for Alternative Futures (IAF) on foresight concepts and methodology. 
15 Further discussion and analysis of the Mont Fleur scenarios process can be found in Kahane (1992) and Gillespie (2004). 
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overview of the specific tools used as part of the scenario-building exercises, the articles do 
provide information on aspects of the process, and especially the public engagement 
dimension. The East Africa scenarios were not the first in the region, but their innovation was 
the active involvement of a wide cross-section of interests and stakeholders, through an 
ambitious public dissemination component. In all three countries, there were elements such 
as extreme political divide, political stalemate, lack of democracy, and the scenarios served 
as an exercise in national dialogue. 
 
The Kenya scenarios were a conscious attempt at participative policymaking, in an effort to 
provide an alternative to undemocratic governance in Kenya. The exercise conducted from 
1998–2000 comprised a research component, with a small grant from the British Council; 
five workshops convened every four to eight weeks; and an extensive dissemination 
process. SID partnered with the Kenyan policy thinktank Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) 
to support organisation of the events held in Kenya. USAID was the main donor of the 
process, with a grant of US$200,000 to SID. The one-year dissemination process, which 
focused on use of the scenarios to catalyse dialogue, comprised two phases (Maina and Sivi 
2004): the first targeted opinion leaders in the public sector, private sector and civil society; 
the second phase targeted the general public. The second phase was carried out through 
partnering with credible and respected community organisations; core roadshow activities 
included a series of participatory theatre workshops and presentations, as well as 
distribution of a research compendium (with the broad facts, data and arguments behind the 
scenarios, and what was driving the trends) and a 48-page booklet which laid out the four 
scenarios in story form. The scenarios were met with enthusiasm: ‘People wanted to listen, 
wanted to share their stories. Only in one place they were chased away by agents of the 
state. In other places they were sent to break up the meeting but ended up staying’ (Muliro, 
interview 7 April 2014).  
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5 Impact  
 
Until recently, remarkably few attempts at evaluation of futures and foresight work have been 
identified worldwide (Slaughter 2009: 16; EEA 2011a; Havas et al. 2010: 97), and there is 
scant literature on evaluation frameworks for foresight initiatives. There is a general reliance 
on self-evaluation; governmental foresight activities have generally been evaluated by the 
direct facilitators, such as the agencies responsible for commissioning the studies, or 
foresight practitioners (Milojević 2013). Whilst the UK Government Office for Science 
commissioned an external review of its entire foresight programme (Georghiou et al. 2006), 
the UK Foresight programme’s project evaluation mechanisms are largely internal, 
conducted by members of the project team: one-year reviews are routinely undertaken to 
assess how the UK Foresight programme’s major foresight studies have been taken forward, 
based on interviews with actors who were identified in the action plan; a mid-term review is 
also conducted for a sample of projects three to five years after the launch of the final 
synthesis report. Parke (interview, 7 November 2013) observes that evidence of impact is 
very variable for the different studies: ‘Some projects have currency in the policy world for a 
long time, others for a very short time; some are still being picked up by the research 
community three to five years on, if no longer in the policy community. In some cases, we 
continue to work with policy stakeholders in different guises, even ten years after the project 
[has officially ended].’ The foresight study on infectious diseases, which involved 
collaboration with the African Union (AU), is believed to have contributed in concrete terms 
to the AU’s development of a ten-year framework on managing risk of infectious diseases, 
and the creation of the Southern African Centre for Infectious Diseases. 
 
The foresight literature provides plenty of examples of the challenges of embedding foresight 
studies in policy decision-making; Sagasti (2004: 1) notes the oft-observed challenge of 
linking ‘future-oriented exercises to the messiness and immediacy of political events and 
decision-making’, and in this respect foresight shares many common challenges with 
research more generally: it is difficult for policymakers to make the time; policymakers may 
not own the process; foresight studies generally consider the long-term future horizon, and 
this may be incompatible with short-term political thinking; and the implications of a foresight 
study may be unclear (Rhydderch 2013). Schultz (2006: 11) notes that horizon scanning’s 
design criteria do not augur well for its quick uptake and widespread dissemination in any 
evidence-based decision environment; for whilst research is expected to be authoritative, a 
horizon scan is necessarily associated with uncertainty.  
 
Johnston (2010) notes that members of the International Foresight Professionals’ Network16 
are under pressure to demonstrate the value of investments in foresight in consequent policy 
and planning; Johnston synthesises the literature regarding the various functions of foresight 
in policymaking, and the discussion paper is a preliminary effort to develop a foresight 
impact schema, in which he outlines five typologies of policy impact: awareness-raising, 
informing, enabling, influencing and directing policy. Whilst these represent a useful 
contribution to the impact debate, there are also other important considerations, namely the 
importance of evaluating impact of the process as well as any product; Kuosa (2011: 22) 
considers tangible as well as intangible outcomes of foresight initiatives. Given their 
interdisciplinary nature and multi-sectoral nature, foresight exercises often behave as a 
‘knowledge junction’ between different areas of research (EFMN 2009: 14), and impact in 
the form of improved networking and information flows should not be ignored.  
                                               
16 The Network membership comprises representatives of foresight units from various OECD member states; whilst they 
recognise the need to link more effectively with developing countries to harness regional expertise on critical global issues such 
as infectious diseases and food security (OECD International Futures Programme 2010: 3), international development is not 
their primary purpose. 
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The debates around the impact of scenarios are interesting because of their focus on 
transformational processes. As stated by Le Pere (2004: 108–9), ‘the real test of scenario 
building is not whether its architects get the future right, but to change behaviour in the right 
direction on the basis of seeing the future differently’. The future is fundamentally 
unknowable, yet everyone holds implicit assumptions about the future, depending on their 
own mental model, based on experience and knowledge. By bringing together individuals 
operating within different paradigms, the worldview of any one individual or organisation may 
be challenged, and thus individuals’ mental maps changed or expanded.17 This highlights 
the importance of acknowledging and exploring uncertainty through collective process. Wack 
(1985: 140), a pioneer of scenario planning, describes the transformational process: 
‘Scenarios deal with two worlds: the world of facts and the world of perceptions. They 
explore for facts but they aim at perceptions inside the heads of decision-makers. Their 
purpose is to gather and transform information of strategic significance into fresh 
perceptions. This transformational process is not trivial – more often than not it does not 
happen. When it works, it is a creative experience that generates a heartfelt “Aha!” from your 
managers… obliges them to question their assumptions…’. This kind of forward-thinking 
exercise with explicit consideration as to how the world will change may be compared to the 
collective design of a theory of change for international development policies and 
programmes, where a range of worldviews and assumptions may enrich the discussion and 
help to ensure that any strategy is ultimately more robust. 
 
As in other applications of foresight, the evidence of use, usefulness and impact of foresight 
initiatives in international development are largely anecdotal. In the organisational decision-
making context, MacDonald (interview 7 April 2014) considers that a key outcome is greater 
resilience, such that individuals and organisations are better prepared to face uncertainty 
and ‘to manoeuvre skilfully when life takes unforeseen turns’, but acknowledges that actually 
measuring this presents a challenge. In the context of visionary public interest scenarios 
such as those developed in East Africa by SID, Heinzen (2004) suggests that the creation of 
a new shared language can be the marker of successful scenario work; in the case of the 
Tanzania scenarios, one noteworthy aspect was that subjects previously considered taboo, 
such as donor dependence and the supposed unity of the country, became open discussion 
points when the scenarios were shared with the broader public (Eyakuze 2004). Heinzen 
also considers whether the foresight exercise led on to something else, as a measure of 
success (Heinzen, interview 31 March 2014); she offers anecdotal evidence of knock-on 
effects, explaining how individuals who were closely involved in (and transformed by) the 
process of developing the Kenya scenarios with SID subsequently played a key role in the 
national government-led visioning process, Kenya Vision 2030. Both practitioners can 
provide anecdotal evidence of changes they have observed in their client group as a result 
of the foresight process, and in some instances, shifts of strategic direction resulting from the 
development of scenarios and testing of policy/programming options.  
 
Given the non-linearity and complexity of policymaking processes, and the challenge of 
evaluating how any subsequent decisions and policies actually affect different stakeholders, 
and especially the poor, perhaps it is better to focus on assessing the extent to which the 
level of futures literacy18 has changed among key stakeholders and decision-makers as a 
result of the foresight process – thus measuring aspects which are closer to the circles of 
influence of those commissioning or facilitating the foresight initiative. I suggest that 
indicators of futures literacy as reflected in decision-making behaviours might include an 
individual’s awareness of the role and potential application of foresight to international 
development policy and programming, capacity to apply foresight thinking by designing and 
                                               
17 Schoemaker (1993) explores the psychological basis for scenario planning as a way to overcome corporate blind spots and 
myopic thinking frames, whilst Bradfield (2004) shares insights from psychology around belief perseverance and confirmation 
bias that make scenario building an appropriate way to inform decision-making processes. 
18 This term was coined by Schultz (2006). 
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facilitating a foresight process or commissioning an externally-facilitated process; at an 
organisational level, futures literacy would be reflected in an enabling environment, whereby 
resources are available for foresight activities and futures thinking is incentivised. 
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6 Conclusions and future directions 
 
Foresight initiatives have been conducted by a range of actors, in different thematic sectors, 
across different regions, on both a grand and a modest scale; however, the body of evidence 
is highly fragmented. Future-oriented studies are better established (and resourced) in 
certain sectors of international development, such as food and agriculture, whilst no 
evidence was found of foresight in relation to education in an international development 
context. There are interesting examples of ad hoc initiatives and processes, such as the 
East Africa scenarios supported by SID. Yet, for the most part, futures thinking has not 
entered the mainstream of international development in terms of the discourse and practice, 
and thus remains marginal to international development endeavour. This is hardly surprising, 
given that foresight is of itself a field still in its infancy. Whilst there are various repositories 
and databases19 of foresight studies and projects, there is none dedicated to international 
development initiatives per se. With the exception of outputs generated by the Humanitarian 
Futures Programme, literature on foresight in the international humanitarian field is scant. 
This paper represents the first attempt to review the evidence of the application of foresight 
approaches and techniques to policy-related work in international development. 
 
Foresight has an important role to play in international development, to ensure that policies 
are robust and forward-looking, and that development organisations and institutions are 
resilient and agile, able to cope with change and manage increasing uncertainty and 
complexity in order to tackle the global and local development and humanitarian challenges 
ahead. Futures thinking could be more effectively integrated into strategy planning cycles of 
international development institutions across the board and, in general, this would require 
greater futures literacy among international development actors. National-level policy 
thinktanks, in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world, have a particular role to play in 
supporting foresight studies, and promoting methodological adaptation and innovation in 
their various contexts. There is a great opportunity to harness rapid advancements in the 
field of ICT for crowd-sourcing and collective intelligence as part of foresight exercises, 
countering the more traditional top-down, expert-led approaches.  
 
                                               
19 These include the Sigma Scan and Delta Scan of the UK Horizon Scanning Centre, the Global Futures Intelligence System of 
the Millennium Project, and the ‘Dynamo’ database of the European Foresight Monitoring Network. 
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